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Technological governance has only been partially successful for technological upgrading in
the five ASEAN countries discussed, with the exception of Singapore. This is a reflection of
the fact that FDI is poorly integrated in local and national structures which severely limits the
spill-over effects. The early successful export-oriented economic development is no longer
viable unless policies and institutions undergo major changes. Furthermore, a continued high
rate of economic growth in China, making country into the ￿factory of the world, is also
upsetting assumptions and viability of earlier policies for technological upgrading in most
ASEAN countries.
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Introduction
1
Southeast Asia has been improving its international position as a home for plants of electrical
machinery/electronics companies and each country is excelling in specific fields of business.
In Singapore, the region’s high-tech leader, engineers are abundant, and the country has
successfully attracted foreign makers of semiconductors and liquid-crystal displays. Malaysia
follows Singapore, centring on the audiovisual field, and is highly valued as a country with
expertise in producing electronics parts.
Indonesia serves as an assembly base, making the most of low labour cost, while the
Philippines, where English is used as an official language, is being utilized as a base for
information-related products such as hard-disk drives and software. Thailand has fewer
engineers than Singapore and Malaysia, but it has an abundant supply of line workers and a
large domestic market. It is more politically stable and has a higher average national income
than Indonesia and the Philippines. Consequently, Thailand has become established as a
production base for consumer-electronics products. In the past several years, investment in the
region has cantered on Thailand due to the political turmoil in Indonesia and the Philippines,
which kept investment away.
Though the largest export category of Thailand is information-technology-related appliances
and parts, the export value of such products has fallen. In contrast, exports of home appliances
have continued to climb. They will likely support the Thai economy to some extent, though
the outlook depends partly on future demand.
In the post-crisis period Singapore has implemented policies to strengthen the domestic
innovation and invention climate and to promote industrial innovation activities through
grants and tax incentives. Singapore has also decided a train a large number of high-level
researchers. However, foreign expatriates continue to play a dominant role in domestic R&D.
Malaysia has continued to strengthen planning and management in science and technology
and to promote technology transfer among industries, government research institutes and
universities. Innovations are also supported by tax incentives and subsidies.
A debate has been raging on the relative importance of factors that contributed to the financial
crisis that hit Pacific Asia in 1997. A major line of thought is that many countries lacked a
solid basis for sustained economic development by primarily relying on expanding inputs of
more capital and labour. The corollary is that technology and education were neglected
sectors. This paper will attempt to highlight some of the shortcomings in science and
technology regimes with a particular focus on selected ASEAN countries.
This paper will focus on two things. First, it will highlight some of the characteristics in
science and technology regimes with a particular focus on selected ASEAN countries ￿
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. A second section will discuss the
                                                
1 This draft paper is partly based on a project, Technological Mapping of Asia Pacific, that was started in 1998
with partial results appearing in:
 Sigurdson, Jon (jointly with Cheng, Alfred Liping) A New Technological Landscape in Asia Pacific, Special
Issue of the International Journal of Technology Management, Vol. 22, No 5/6, 2001.4
shortcomings that existed and examine the changes in technology regimes, which have taken
place since the financial crisis. The analysis will have a focus on the interaction between the
public and private sectors, as seen in the context of an ongoing globalisation process.
Available data show substantial increases in patenting by Asian companies in the major
market for industrial products - the United States. Pacific Asia overtook the European Union
already in the mid-1980s and has expanded dramatically in sectors like telecommunications,
and computers and data processing systems
2. This may indicate that Pacific Asia is more
stirred than EU to protect their intellectual property rights in the US. Furthermore, increases
in the number of scientific papers also indicate a substantial expansion in research activities,
which are likely to strengthen the support for future innovative activities in Pacific Asia.
Finally, US is ahead of EU in establishing closer links both in joint research and in joint
patenting with partners in the region. However, Japan followed by Taiwan and Korea, and
more recently China, is dominant in these statistics.
Long before the financial crisis in Asia there was in the region a preoccupation with the role
of technology and exploitation of R&D resources although with varying results from country
to country. However, the countries in Asia Pacific, with the possible exceptions of Japan and
Korea, had already been influenced by rapid changes in the global economy, which has
drastically reduced the prospects for establishing truly national innovation systems. The
reasons are threefold.
•   First, corporate R&D has become taken on the character of a global resource as a
consequence of markets and production becoming increasingly global.
•   Second, as a sequel large product segments, particularly in electronics, have become
integral parts of Cross-National Production Networks (CPNs), which is today clearly
exemplified by the production of the hard disk drives that is used in every computer.
•   Third, services and other commercial activities, based on telecommunications and
other digital technology, have recently and rapidly emerged as crucial and momentous
parts of national economies, which have become most visible in the US.
Technological opportunities are opening up on a global scale and can be seen as paralleling
and complementing priorities in marketing strategies. Thus, large global companies develop
new organisational practises in order to fully utilise decentralised technological opportunities.
Notwithstanding, national objectives exist and have to be formulated in light of global
changes.
It has in recent years been argued that the confines of national innovation systems have
become increasingly locked up and that national science and technology is becoming
subordinated to corporate technology strategies, which sustain Cross-National Production
Networks for many types of products.
Apparent that the intensity of global competition in many industries, clearly exemplified in
the electronics sector, has forced even innovation-oriented companies to forcibly pursue
efficiency in production. Subsequently, there is a tendency for global companies to let their
subsidiaries abroad take on a larger responsibility for competitiveness, which often include
important elements of product development. This would often require a high degree of
                                                
2 Sigurdson, Jon & Persson, Olle, The new technological landscape in Pacific Asia: an enquiry into the dramatic
changes in patenting and scientific publishing, Research Evaluation, April 1998, pp 31-385
responsiveness that will be better served by using local creative resources. This provides a
potential, within sub-national regions, of creating fundamental and indispensable technology
in such a way that a technological clustering of corporate activities may emerge in appropriate
locations.
The key to improving technology performance, as stated by OECD in its study of National
Innovation Systems, dwells in the understanding of the linkages among the actors involved in
innovation
3. Such an insight requires broad and systematic knowledge of the domestic
innovation system, of systems in other countries, and of the increasingly interlocking
character of large global companies. Without such intelligence realistic national objectives
cannot be formulated. Even if so, goals and instruments still have to be constantly modified in
the light of changes within a national innovation system, which is increasingly taking on
global characteristics. This paper will for selected countries identify and discuss changes in
technology regimes, which have taken place since the financial crisis.
The countries chosen include the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore,
which not only exemplify countries at very different levels of economic development but also
illuminate very policies and conditions for their implementation. The Philippines is a country
that has been weak in both formulation and implementation and rudimentary infrastructure
and institutions for technological development and has been less able to attract foreign
investment (FDI). Indonesia has pursued a two-thronged policy of developing of developing
high-technology sectors an actively encouraging FDI. Both policies are partial failure because
infrastructure, institutions and human resources have been lacking. Vietnam has in recent
years moved from a planned economy with well developed institutions towards a market
economy, which requires completely different policies, and institutions. Malaysia has from its
early success in attracting FDI of increasing sophistication moved towards an emphasis on
selective development of high-technology sectors, for which clustering is an important policy
instrument. Singapore at an early stage decided that it would integrate its nation with the
global economy and has become a heaven for FDI in specific sectors. The success made
Singapore into a high-wage country, which prompted a policy shift towards mobilising the
means to make Singapore into a knowledge-based economy. However, in hardly any of the
countries, with the partial exception of Singapore has technology yet made as significant
contribution to economic development as might be expected.
  The technology and innovation policy requires a broad understanding of the interaction
between long-term economic development, the internationalisation (globalisation) of the
world economy, government intervention into economy, and microeconomics of the
innovation on company level. It is worth to mention that the most advanced of the countries
studied spend over 2% of their GDP on research and development and the others have the
ambitions to follow Thus the term ￿political economy of technological development￿ came to
existence.
Political Economy of Technological Development
4
Technological change has been accelerated by globalisation, as markets opened and
                                                
3 OECD 1997 National Innovation Systems, Paris
4 This section is based on a discussion in Technology Policy in the European Union, by Peterson, John and
Sharp, Margaret, London (MACMILLAN Press) 19986
competitors looked to innovation as a means of gaining market advantage. The globalisation
has raised several fundamental issues for developing and latecomer countries. First, national
policy makers aiming to catch-up with more developed world have to formulate science and
technology programs that are in tune with rapid technological development. Second, national
governments want to assist their own national companies but it is no longer clear - through the
cross-border process of mergers and acquisitions - which companies are national as the
identities of firms are increasingly blurred. The second issue prompts a shift in policy focus
from the macro to the micro-level, where governments seek to influence the performance of
firms and industries - active industrial policy. The first issue requires a close interaction with
a global system of innovation - active science, technology and education policies).
The world economy shows broad inequalities that arise from globalisation. A widening of
disparities in technological capability between more and less technologically advanced
countries is an important political issue of technological development. Many multinational
companies have globalised their production, but few have shifted research and development
capabilities or corporate headquarters away from their traditional home bases. An important
reason for this situation is that technology, in terms of machines and blueprints has become
extremely mobile while technological competence embodied in capable humans  is still much
less so.
Furthermore, it has become recognised that the capacity to innovate is cumulative as
innovation gives birth to more innovation. A firm may shift production facilities plant and
machinery overseas but people tend not to move. Knowledge and skills acquired over time by
the people who work in research remain key factors and it is not easy to pick up new, state-of-
the-art technologies without the knowledge and the skills required for making good use of
them.
This pattern of technological development has powerful political effects. Countries, and firms,
that start with less sophisticated technological competence may be left behind, and often find
it very difficult to catch up. More intense competition, between more firms pushes forward
the development of ever more sophisticated technologies. This means that the process of
competition reinforces the advantage of those in the lead and takes them further along the
learning curve. The tendency for technological development to reinforce existing competitive
advantages has powerful repercussions, which may be illustrated by the development of the
Internet - creating a wide gap between industrialised and developing countries.
A further change in the political economy of research and technological development arises
from new industrial structures. Nation states are scarcely able to influence the activities of
large, oligopolistic MNCs whose businesses and internal structures are global in scale, and
can easily be shifted to new production sites. Simultaneously many multinational companies
with globalised activities have decentralised their productive and distributive capacities. The
phenomenon is usually referred to networked organisations and is constantly increasing in
scope and scale.
So, countries must develop catch-up policies with foundations strongly based on facilitating
the access to new technologies and active inducement of foreign direct investments. It has
become evident that technologies become diffused more easily if they are embraced widely by
citizens in democratic societies. However the historical perspective of the last half of the 20th
century in East Asia proves that strong but enlighted political regimes were more successful
in imposing development oriented, catch-up  policies than the weaker governments.7
 Nowadays though, technology policies, which in the past have traditionally been producer-
driven, have to thoughtfully consider the demand side. A broad and similar lesson may be
drawn from the cases of nuclear power in the 1970s, cattle growth hormones in the 1980s and
gene technologies in the 1990s Such technologies will not catch on unless they are viewed by
citizens as safe, ethical and consumer friendly. Thus successful diffusion depends just as
much on social attitudes as it does on technology.
While examining the governmental structures of selected countries one finds variety of state
agencies with the special responsibilities for education, technology and science. On the very
top level there are the example, as in Philippines, of secretaries of the president cabinet
responsible for the area and in other countries a respective ministry in the prime minister￿s
office. The following summary is a first attempt to highlight the character of technology
policy and technology development in five ASEAN countries by focusing on inherent
features, perceived shortcoming and significant changes that taken place during the past few
years.8
The Shortcomings of S&T Policies in the Philippines
Philippines ranks low in several R&D indicators such as the ratio of R&D expenditure to
GNP, which is very low. Similarly, the country ranks low in terms of number of personnel
engaged in R&D. In a study from the Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS) it is
stated that the number of scientists and engineers per million population was only 152 in
1992. However the composition of the national cabinet shows at least two bodies responsible
for science and education - Secretary for Education, Culture and Sports and Secretary of
Science. Secretary of Science leads the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
The country’s educational system produces low number of graduates in science and
engineering although the number of students at the tertiary level is actually quite high in the
Philippines. PIDS points out that there is a great demand for technical and engineering-related
graduates by local industries and that the private tertiary schools primarily train non-technical
students. An important reason for this mismatch is that the private colleges are not able or not
willing to invest in costly laboratory equipment. This mismatch continues at the next level and
PIDS reports that more than 50% of R&D personnel with Ph.D. degrees - in government
agencies, and state universities and colleges - have their degrees in social sciences.
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There has been a general failure in the Philippines to use technology to gain competitive
advantage.  Resource-based exports (timber, copper) are basically in raw material or
unprocessed form.  Traditional agricultural exports (coconut, sugar, and banana) are also
exported without infusing technology-based processing in the valued-added chain. The overall
assessment on the state of science and technology in the Philippines is at level set by
UNESCO for less developed countries. In terms of human resources, the Philippines has only
155 R & D scientists and engineers per million population which are far below the UNESCO
target of 380 for Asian LDCs. Science and engineering education needs to be strengthened.
Curricula are outdated, qualified teachers are needed, and laboratory facilities have to be
procured.
The government created the National Science and Development Board (NSDB) in 1958 to
formulate and implement S&T policies, and to co-ordinate S&T agencies.  In 1974, a national
science development plan was incorporated in the Medium-Term Development Plan: 1974-
1977.  All succeeding Medium-Term Development Plans contained a chapter or sections
related to S&T policies, plans, and programs. The Department of Science and Technology
(DOST) introduced the Science and Technology Master Plan (STMP) in 1990 which set the
goals and objectives for the Science and Technology (S&T) sector, and provided a framework
for the effective co-ordination of S&T projects and programs consistent with national
development policies. The Comprehensive Technology Transfer and Commercialisation
(CTTC) program was initiated to disseminate and commercialise locally developed
technologies.  But there was a lack of locally developed commercially viable technologies. In
1993, DOST introduced a Science and Technology Agenda for National Development
(STAND), a successor to STMP.
There were three main strategies of the STMP: (1) modernisation of the production sector
through massive technology transfer from domestic and foreign sources, (2) upgrading of
R&D capability through intensive activities in high priority sectors, and (3) development of
S&T infrastructure, including institution building, manpower development and development
of S&T culture.
STAND￿s objective was to help realise the vision of Philippines 2000 by focusing S & T
activities on export niches identified by the private sector. The renewed attempt to formulate
industrial policy is a reiteration of the vital role of industrial progress to sustain future
economic growth in the country.  However, ad-hoc or de-facto industrial policies have not
stressed the need for active promotion of technology to build up a strong foundation for
industrialisation.
The major thrust of Philippine S&T policy has been recently subjected to contrasting
recommendations.  One view recommends that the universities and research institutes focus
on the basic sciences and advanced technologies to provide the foundation for sustained
technological development.  This view is popularly called ￿supply-push￿ or ￿technology-
push.￿  The other view argues that it makes more sense for the government to provide the
enabling environment for the private sector to purchase technologies that it needs.
The most reasonable conclusion that can be made is that both STMP and STAND cannot be
implemented. Therefore DOST must effectively address the following problems: (1) shortage
of high-quality S & T manpower, (2) dependence on technology importation, (3) low level of
private sector participation in R & D, (4) low level of basic research in core, strategic, and
emerging technologies such as biotechnology, new materials science, robotics, and10
information technology, (5) lack of technology data bank and information network, (6)
absence of science programs for the younger generation, and (7) insufficient financial
resources for S & T development.
In 2000s DOST under new Science Secretary undertook new initiatives. The Medium Term
Plan for 1999-2004 outlines the vision and priority goals for establishing a competitive
science community. As a result the department supported some 15000 students and trained
1635 teachers in science and mathematics in year 2001. DOST also started the Philippine
Research Education and Government Information Network, and it offers over 15 different
technological assistance programmes for SMEs  through different DOST offices and agencies
in the country. There are about 16 offices willing to help the local entrepreneur, among them:
Technology Training Centre, DOST-Academe Technology, Global Technology Search,
Couple of technology financing, investors for a and fairs, Municipal S&T Program,
Intellectual Property Rights Program and others. DOST also advertises and supports
successful innovative initiatives via perfectly designed website.
These new actions are too fresh to be assessed; however they prove the new government
consciousness about the importance of country internal visions of development in
confrontation with dramatic cuts in FDI inflow in the late 1990s. To improve the R & D
delivery system the authors suggest the consequent strengthening of following measures: (1)
reorganise the government-supported R & D institutes into a new corporate structure that
gives them flexibility and autonomy; (2) strengthen network of schools or consortia to
maximise use of resources and develop core competence; (3) promote the development of
S&T culture.11
The Dominance of FDI in Indonesia
Indonesia was considered to be the poorest of the countries in the region. It also has the most
complicated ethnical structure and serious political problems ￿ party as a result of the latter.
The manufacturing sector in Indonesia has sustained a high rate of growth for a number of
years and both its share of GNP and exports have increased rapidly. New industrial sectors
include electronics and transportation equipment and the textile has through modernisation
become highly competitive.
The above mentioned phenomena can be attributed to the significant inflow of FDI. The
government organisation in Indonesia is relatively complicated with broad prerogatives given
to provincial governors. However at the state level there is an office of Minister for National
Education responsible for overall science and education policy.
The technological foundation of the country is weak, as the capital goods sector is
underdeveloped. The country’s ability to absorb and improve imported technologies is also
weak, particularly when it comes to complex technologies. A number of successful export
industries controlled or propelled by FDI, have remained concentrated in labour-intensive
assembly or resource processing activities. Moving away from this pattern of development
will require a significant reorientation of the country’s technology strategy. Almost all R&D
activities in Indonesia are carried out in government research institutes (GRI), although there
is an increasing demand for industrial R&D due to the rapid expansion of the industrial sector.
This poses a challenge for reform as the GRI activities rarely in their orientation or research
results correspond to the needs within the industrial sector.
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Since mid-1997 Indonesia’s economic policy-makers have been primarily concentrated their
efforts in dealing with the most serious financial and economic crisis the country has faced
since its independence. However, once macroeconomic stability is restored, the Indonesian
economy will once again be facing the same challenge as it was facing before the onset of the
crisis, namely how to sustain the growth of Indonesia’s manufactured exports. Sustaining it is
crucial to nourishing the growth of the manufacturing sector, which since the end of the oil
boom era in the early 1980s has emerged as the major engine of growth as well as the major
source of foreign exchange earnings. Indonesia can no longer continue to rely on its
traditional sources of comparative advantage, namely its cheap but low skill labour and its
natural resources. Instead, it would, just like the first tier newly industrialising countries
(NICs) in East Asia, have to develop a more sustainable base of comparative advantage.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has generally been the major vehicle for the transfer of
technology and other resources (capital, managerial and marketing know-how, and access to
world markets) from the advanced to the developing countries. To what extent FDI leads to
the development of local technological capabilities depends a great deal on the economic
policies pursued by the host government as well as on the local absorptive capability, that is
the availability of adequately skilled human resources. Unlike Singapore, Japan and South
Korea and to a lesser extent Taiwan pursued highly restrictive policies towards FDI, as they
put a high priority on promoting indigenous enterprises and deepening local technological
capabilities. Indonesia has in general not been very successful in using FDI to promote the
development of local technological capabilities, despite the fact that it has since the late 1960s
been receiving large amounts of FDI, at least until the severe economic crisis of 1997/1998
virtually halted the inflow of new FDI.
Therefore, Indonesia has not been successful in using FDI more effectively for its industrial
technology development. This has been caused by the fact that the Indonesian government
has, unlike for instance the government of Singapore and the other Southeast Asian countries,
not taken a more pro-active approach to attracting the kind of FDI the country needed for
promoting its industrial technology development.
Findings of some recent firm-level studies on the impact of FDI on Indonesia’s industrial
technology development in Indonesia’s manufacturing sector indicate serious shortcomings.
Surveys indicate that in joint ventures the interest of the foreign investors in technology
transfer was mainly limited to production engineering that is the smooth operation of the
plants. As the foreign-controlled firms mostly relied on the designs developed by the parent
company, their design capability is also low. Similarly, industrial engineering capabilities of
joint ventures are low, because these ventures rely on their parent companies for these
capabilities.
During the period of import-substituting industrialisation in the 1970s and early 1980s, many
foreign investors may have been tempted to use relatively obsolete technologies, specifically
obsolete capital equipment, as even with these technologies they were able to sell their
products in the highly protected domestic markets.
Development in Indonesia has indicated that in most joint ventures the technology transferred
from the MNCs to the local employees has been mostly limited to the basic technological13
capabilities required during the early stages of industrialisation, which is the skills and
knowledge required for the efficient operation of the plant. Other factors which have
hampered Indonesia from taking more advantage from FDI to promote technology transfer
and diffusion has been the shortage of an adequately skilled labour force and the weakness of
its relatively few supporting supplier industries.
The development of industrial technological capabilities (ITCs) such as operational
(production), acquisitive (investment), adaptive (minor change), and innovative (major
change) capabilities, are essential. In order to obtain greater technological benefit from FDI
than it has so far, the Indonesian government must pursue sound macroeconomic policies and
pro-competition policies to ensure a competitive business environment. The country must also
pursue a much more consistent and transparent policy to attract the FDI that it now needs
more than ever for its economic recovery and subsequently for sustaining its economic growth
and export- oriented industrialisation.
To achieve this, the Indonesian government needs to continue dismantling its still
cumbersome regulatory framework in order to further reduce the still high facilitation costs
associated with setting up a new plant or office. No less important, the Indonesian
government will need to pay a high priority on further developing its human resources in
order to raise their capacity to absorb, assimilate, modify, and improve the imported
technologies, whether transferred through FDI or purchased through technical licensing
agreements.
For a developing country, such as Indonesia, which in various ways still lags behind its East
Asian neighbours in its industrial development, industrial technology development does not
primarily involve the costly development of new technologies. The development of industrial
technological capabilities should in first instance focus on developing the capacity to select,
diffuse, and build on imported technologies. A favourable incentive system conducive to
industrial technology development should include both sound macroeconomic as well as
outward-looking and pro-competition policies. This would motivate and encourage
manufacturing firms to undertake the necessary but risky long-term investments in industrial
technology development. The training of skilled people and improvements of the educational
sector is, as in the Philippines, of crucial importance.
Recent research on technological development in Indonesia summarises the situation in the
following five assumptions
5.
•   First, S&T policies that target specific high-technology industries will fail when
technological, managerial and institutional infrastructure is underdeveloped, and
micro-level intervention cannot achieve desired objectives.
•   Second, foreign direct investment (FDI) is essential for technological development to
offset constraints in domestic structures. However, FDI does not automatically
generate technological spillover and linkage effects, which require complementary
actions and resources in the domestic economy.
•   Third, systematic efforts are needed in the public sector to acquire, upgrade and
disseminate technology and know-how when a country moves up the technological
ladder, and will require direct government intervention.
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2001), Stockholm School of Economics14
•   Fourth, external sources of technology are not only important but also essential in
early stages of industrial development and require efficient channels of transfer, which
must be accompanied by openness to trade, investment and skilled labour.
•   Fifth, the shift in focus to the role of FDI in the globalisation process has exposed the
important but not relatively unexplored link with human capital. Indonesia must, like
other developing countries, formulate efficient policies that can exploit the shift in
demand for certain model skills that FDI bring with them
6.
                                                
6 Ref, ￿ Technological Mapping￿15
Science and Technology in Vietnam
The supply of scientific and technical expertise is of critical importance for Vietnam.
Industrialisation and economic growth have been at the forefront of the country￿s
development strategy for a long time, although there has until recently not been much
attention to reforms and strategy in the domain of science and technology policy. Within the
national government there are Ministry of Science and Technology
7 and Ministry of
Education and Training.
The apparent science and technology policies in Vietnam have been designed to encourage
and support the acquisition of new technologies. However, taxation laws and the tax
collection systems impose constraints on the process of acquiring technology for enterprises,
the private ones in particular.
8 The new law for private enterprises being implemented in 2002
has changed the situation and doubled into 70000 the number of SMEs in Vietnam amounting
to some 45% in the whole economy. However majority of private sector is located in
agriculture and consist of so-called family-household activities.
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The situation has become more critical as information and communication technologies have
become more pervasive at the same time as the economy of Vietnam has taken on an outward
orientation. Given the opportunities of a knowledge-based economy there is an immediate
need to identify the necessary structural reforms in the science and technology sector as the
country is being integrated into the international economy. Remaining competitive in
international markets will require introduction and upgrading technologies that will reduce the
effect of rising labour costs.
After the exodus of the French in the late 1950s the science and technology system in
Vietnam took on the character of that in socialist planned economy, with a direct and strong
influence from USSR and other countries in Central Europe. They provided training and
education for engineers, doctors and administrators and most S&T programs were based on
models from USSR and Eastern Europe. As a consequence science and technology activities
were almost completely isolated from the rest of the economy. Innovative activity was
controlled from the top by decrees and was focused on capital goods and defence equipment,
which received priority attention.
The ￿doi moi￿ of economic reforms that was introduced in 1986 and the subsequent reforms
have provided a policy orientation of cautious liberalisation and decentralisation.
Furthermore, a fiscal crisis has been affecting the R&D institutions in Vietnam. As a result,
the state does no longer hold a monopoly on S&T activities and serious budget constraints
have forced government agencies to decentralise, privatise and even abandon a number of
S&T programs. The National Centre for Natural Science and Technology exemplifies this
new situation. The Centre has come to rely extensively on contract research and consultancy
without which it would most likely cease to exist. The result is that the Centre has become
oriented towards applied research and more directly linked to the demand of industrial firms.
The two powerful institutions managing research and technology policy on the state level are
the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) associated with Ministry of Industry
and Trade and National Institute of Science and Technology Policy and Strategic Studies
(NISTPASS) affiliated into Ministry of Science and Technology. They promote state
programs and co-operate actively with foreign institutions.
Another change is a growing collaboration with foreign partners. The Foreign Investment
Law, and Law on Science and Technology of 1995 are of particular importance as they
include rules for the protection of industrial property rights, copyrights and also a legal
framework to govern technology transfer.
9
It is important that efficient mechanisms be established for a systematic monitoring of
technical change that is taking place in other countries. Only on this basis is it possible to
identify the appropriate means for obtaining, adapting and diffusing already available
technology to be utilised in Vietnam. However, the S&T sector in Vietnam is lacking the
dynamic character that could boost the country￿s economic development, and the reasons are
manifold.
•   First, many research institutes are still dependent on government funding, which
usually is insufficient due to budget constraints.
                                                
9 The new Science and Technology Law came into existence in 2002 with more autonomy for research
institutions and individuals. It also covers the intellectual property rights issue.17
•   Second, the linkages between enterprises and research institutes remain weak, or even
very weak, which reflects the lack of an articulated demand within the enterprise
sector, which is still dominated by state-owned enterprises.
•   Third, the opportunities for advanced overseas training have been quite limited since
the 1980s, whereas much of the older generation of scientists and engineers received
their training and higher education in the socialist planned economies.
•   Fourth, there is an unmet need for high-level training in areas like policy formulation
and implementation not only in science and technology policy but also in areas such as
labour, environmental, financial and macroeconomic policies.
Finally, it is important to note that the state sector dominates the economy in Vietnam but is
unlikely to be an engine of growth during the present decade. An important reason is that the
SOEs will not generate enough jobs to absorb a significant share of new entrants into the
labour market, which is estimate to be in the region of 1.2-1.4 million per year. Thus, it
appears that private SMEs, and joint venture with FDI partners, will play an increasingly
important role in the country￿s economic development.
It has become obvious that Vietnam during the past couple of years has been experiencing
serious political and economic difficulties in its transition from a centrally planned economy
to an economy based on risk-taking, incentives and a role of the government that should
preferably be limited to general guidance and encouragement. Under these circumstances it is
critical for Vietnam to develop a capability to analyse the country￿s scientific and
technological environment, both domestically and internationally. This capability should be
brought forward to include advanced skills to formulate and implements science and
technology that are appropriate in a constantly changing environment.
A recent report
10 says that there seems to exist a strong commitment to integrate the science
and technology system with national social and economic objectives, and also making S&T
an integral part of the country￿s industrialisation efforts. The innovative ideas of establishing
private education system in Vietnam is welcomed in enhgineering sciences but meets certain
obstruction as far as social sciences are concerned.
11 There are a number of accompanying
policy changes to make research demand-driven and create more autonomy for research
institutes. However, weak implementation remains the major hurdle for efficient use of
science and technology resources in Vietnam.
                                                
10 Kang, Olivia Ho-Kyung, Science and Technology Strategy Review in Vietnam, EIJS WP No. 133 (October
2001), Stockholm School of Economics
11 The Australia￿s Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology has a freshly established branch campus in Ho Chi
Minh City and Harvard University and Connecticut College are initiating training programs  and academic
exchange. ￿ ￿Open minds open doors￿ Far Eastern Economic Review  August 1, 2002 page28.18
Technology Modernisation in Malaysia
Malaysia in its long-term visionary plan for 2020 strongly emphasised the role of R&D for
technological development. This is also reflected in the Action Plan for Industrial Technology
(TAP 1990).It is also underlined in The Third Outline Perspective Plan 2000, prepared by
Economic Planning Unit
12. The National Council for Scientific Research and Development
(MPKSN) plays an important role in co-ordinating and developing the country’s resources for
R&D. Among government ministries there are Ministry of Education and Ministry of Science,
Technology and Environment.
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 In a first inventory, 1994, of Malaysia’s human resources in R&D it was found that the
number of researchers per 10,000 people is only 2 while the corresponding figure for
Singapore is 40.  The GDP per capita expenditures on education places Malaysia in the
second place after Singapore among the 5 analysed countries. Relatively low numbers of
tertiary students is considered to be the result of huge numbers of country students being
educated abroad.
                                                
12 EPU, Kuala Lumpur 2000.19
Malaysia has substantial industrial activities in electronics industry, namely in packaging
integrated circuits. Basically all global manufacturers of ICs have part of their activity located
in Malaysia. This reflects the fact that Malaysia has been perceived as an attractive location
for economic and non-economic reasons. The latter factors include the country’s political
stability, the welcoming attitude of government as expressed in a number of favourable
government policies, a good infrastructure in urban areas, a highly productive labour force,
and well developed financial and banking sectors. Following from an early emphasis of FDI
as an instrument for employment generation Malaysia has substantially upgraded its
technological capabilities, which has encouraged existing FDI to expand into more
sophisticated production.
MIGHT was set up in 1993 as an independent non-profit company providing a platform for
government and industry collaboration. Organisationally it is located under the office of the
Science Advisor in the Prime Minister￿s Department and led by a joint industry-government
board. MIGHT, in the words of its Chief Executive, Dr. Ahmed Tasir: ￿In a nutshell, MIGHT
is a symbiotic relationship between the private and public sectors of Malaysia for the pursuit
of a common goal of heralding a new era of technology-led development in the country￿.
MIGHT￿s activities are focused on the following sectors earmarked for national development:
!  Aerospace
!  Advanced materials
!  Low emission vehicles
!  Telecommunications
!  Road haulage
!  Pharmaceuticals
!  Housing and construction
Malaysia has, under the leadership of its Prime Minister, taken a bold visionary initiative to
establish multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) close to Kuala Lumpur. The new airport is
located in the same area and eventually the capital with its government agencies will move to
the same location. The MSC covers an area, which approximately the same size as Singapore.
 ￿The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) is Malaysia￿s gift to the world.￿ On this note almost
all presentation materials on the MSC commence - making clear that the MSC initiative,
launched in 1996, is an open invitation to the global multimedia community. The MSC is a 15
by 50 kilometre ￿green corridor￿ stretching from the Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC) in
the north to the new Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) located in the south, due to
be opened in mid-1998. Two new cities are taking form within the MSC, the new
administrative seat of the to-become-electronic federal government called Putrajaya, and the
new IT city of Cyberjaya. The latter, located in the western part of the centre of the corridor,
will consist of enterprise, commercial and residential precincts and will also include public
and recreational areas. Cyberjaya is to be the core development zone of the seven MSC
flagships (see below), and is estimated to have a population of 240,000 (90,000 residents) and
to be the location of 500 IT and multimedia companies by the year 2020. Development would
take place in four phases; the first was scheduled for completion in 1999. Unfortunately the
financial crisis and a bigger than threefold drop in FDI have drastically limited the assumed
results of MSC, as ￿Silicon Valley of Southeast Asia￿. The MSC remains so far in the state of
infancy and in is not possible to make any evaluation.
The Multimedia Development Corporation (MDC) is a government-appointed and
government-backed corporation with the task of leading the management and development of20
the MSC. MDC sees its role as a promoter and facilitator handling the application process for
companies wishing to receive MSC status, expediting permit and licence approvals, and
establishing contacts with local partners and financiers. Being a government-owned
corporation that is actively supported by the Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, MDC
has a unique ability to cut through bureaucratic red tape, and guarantees a 30-day turnaround
for all applications.
The MDC has set a 20-year timeframe for the full implementation of the MSC, at the end of
which Malaysia expects to be one of the leaders of the Information Age. Development has
been divided into three phases of activity. The success of the MSC rests on the successful
development of four supporting pillars: 1) soft infrastructure (legislative framework, manpower,
attractive incentives); 2) physical infrastructure; 3) high-capacity telecom infrastructure and; 4) the
MDC. To attract companies to establish themselves within the MSC, and receive ￿MSC status￿, a
promising Bill of Guarantees complemented with generous financial incentives has been set-up.
The budding technological capability in Malaysia owes its existence to an early nurturing of
FDI and a strong commitment by the government to support selected sectors by developing
infrastructure and formulate appropriate policies. There are however problems arising from
the fact that chosen economic zones can hardly integrate with the rest of economy. There are
also artificial barriers between zones and the rest of country economy and significant
diversities between regions in economic development and among local policies. For example
relatively successful development of Penang as a ￿mini-Singapore￿ is a result of local
government policy supporting (mainly Chinese) SMEs. This is evidently contrary to federal
attitude against  the Chinese minority.  The country is still lacking the educational resources
to sustain continued and rapid technological development.21
Singapore ￿ A Global Centre for R&D
Singapore is after Japan the most advanced country in Asia Pacific and has started to
implement large-scale changes in its knowledge and information sectors as they are expected
to become the most important factors for future economic growth. Singapore has declared that
it wants to turn the nation into a knowledge-based economy. This declaration is expressed by
the most developed system of government ministries devoted to accomplish the task. They
include Ministry of Education, Ministry of Communication and Information Technology and
Ministry of National Development.
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Singapore has realised that it is need of post-crisis growth strategy as it feels threatened by
both, developing countries such as China, which has low labour costs, cheap production costs,
and thus price competitiveness, and by developed countries such as the United States, which
has technological competitiveness and production efficiencies.  Therefore, Singapore feels
some pressure to shift its development strategy from a traditional government-led
industrialisation strategy to a different strategy that can utilise Singapore￿s most important
competitive advantage - namely, its well-educated people. This implies that the
transformation of its economy should be made in a knowledge-based economy.
A knowledge-based strategy consists of making more effective use of new and existing
knowledge and technology throughout the whole economy. There are four important elements
in a knowledge-based strategy:22
1.  An economic and institutional regime that provides incentives for the efficient use of
existing knowledge and the creation of new knowledge and entrepreneurship.
2.  An educated and skilled population that can create and use knowledge.
3.  A dynamic information infrastructure that can facilitate the effective communication,
dissemination, and processing of information.
4.  An effective innovation system where enterprises, research centres, universities and other
organisations interact effectively to create and diffuse technologies using the growing
stock of domestic and global knowledge.
Singapore has a small population and limited space. The state has created an attractive climate
for foreign high technology companies to locate within this limited area. This has been
achieved through a combination of tax incentives, government investments and subsidies, and
more recently through development of R&D infrastructure. As a result almost one half of the
global production of hard disk drives takes place in Singapore, which contributes about 12 per
cent of GNP.
In terms of share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in its gross domestic investment
Singapore is the most FDI-intensive economy in the Asia Pacific region, not be matched
anywhere else in the world. However, Singapore has encouraged internalised modes of
technology transfer, although with thorough targeting in the FDI selection and in the process
of technology development. Singapore has extensively use subsidies and other incentives to
cause the foreign companies to bring in more advanced technologies and thereby boost local
technological activity. Although, industrial activity in Singapore is mainly driven by foreign
MNCs the country is relaying on upgrading technological skills and industry contributes
considerably to local design and development.
The nature of FDI into Singapore has become increasingly sophisticated and is a key
instrument in continuously upgrading the economy. The adoption of a very liberal
immigration policy is aimed at attracting foreign professionals and skilled labour to become
permanent residents and offset local workforce shortages. The government is also an active
player in driving economic development by establishing state-owned enterprises or
government-linked corporations in key industrial areas that are either not satisfactorily
pursued by the private sector, or deemed to be of strategic national importance.
The R&D activities in Singapore are, similar to the industrial structure, closely geared to meet
the needs of information technologies (IT) and a number of R&D organisations are
specifically focused on IT development. The second five-year NSTP - NSTP 2000 - launched
in 1996, projected S$4 billion government spending until the year 2000, which is twice the
figure allocated in 1991, representing 1.6% of gross national output but still short of the 2%
goal. The number of RSEs was targeted at 65 per 10,000 labour force.
The new organisations in mid-90s were established to strongly support the country￿s S&T
policies. The National Science and Technology Board is focusing on basic research while the
Economic Development Board is concentrating on applied and development activities.
Offering high salaries and an open labour market Singapore has been able to attract by 1999,
about 17% of its science and technology personnel from foreign countries. Generous grants
have been offered to MNCs to undertake R&D activities and the Skills Development Fund
offers substantial funds for training. However,  the efficiency in linking public research
institutes wih enterprises is lacking and mobility of local researchers may pose a long-term
threat.23
The NSTP provides the Singapore Government with an policy framework to guide and
support national research and technological diffusion through activities such as fiscal
incentives, R&D funding, infrastructure and manpower development and setting up national
research facilities, which include 8 research institutes and 5 research centres. Today, the key
industry and service clusters targeted for development by NSTB are:
!  Manufacturing and engineering systems
!  Information technology and services
!  Electronic components and systems
!  Chemicals and environmental technology
!  Life sciences  - biotechnology, food and agrotechnology
Under the guidance of the Economic Development Board (EDB) Singapore is undertaking
ambitious biomedical initiatives such as the building of a clinical trials centre for drug
manufacture and the development of a genetic reference database program and bioinformatics
centre. The database will be established in collaboration with the Singapore Genomics
Program (SGP) that is collaborating with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The
Bioinformatics
13  Centre (BIC) that was established in 1966 with funding from EDB plays a
leading role in the Asia-Pacific Bioinformatics Network, and has during 2000 undergone a
major reorganisation to give it a more commercial edge.
Singapore is already recognised as a pharmaceutical-manufacturing centre. International
companies like Aventis, Glaxo Smith-Kline, Merck Sharp and Dohme, Schering-Plough and
American Home Products have invested over $1.3 billion in plants to produce active
pharmaceutical ingredients and finished products.
14 Glaxo also coordinates its clinical trials
research in the region out of Singapore.
Singapore￿s single-minded aim at becoming a developed nation soon after the turn of the
century starts from the National Innovation Framework for Action (NIFA), which was made
public in January 1998. The NIFA document was prepared during 1997 by three agencies:
Economic Development Board (EDB), National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) and
Singapore Productivity and Standards Board (SPSB). Taking into consideration the recent
regional currency turmoil, the framework aims to be the starting point from which an
innovation roadmap for Singapore can be developed.
The underlying rationale for NIFA is that Singapore can no longer rely on labour and capital
to sustain growth in the global economy. The new competitive environment forces Singapore
to focus on enhancing capabilities to be able to compete globally in new areas. Innovation is
identified as the instrument that will give Singapore a differential advantage in the third
millennium. Previous instruments promoting and encouraging technological innovation,
development and commercialisation are not considered sufficient. Innovation will be the
differentiating factor in sustaining Singapore￿s long-term competitiveness because it will
allow rapid advances in capability and value-added growth.
                                                
13 Bioinformatics is an interdisciplinary research area that may be broadly defined as the interface between
biological and computational sciences. It involves solving complex biological problems using computational
tools and systems. It also includes the collection, organization,, storage and retrieval of biological information
and databases.
14 Discovering Drugs in Singapore, Andrew Witty (Glaxo Vice-President), Far Eastern Economic Review,
November 5, 200124
Impressed observers argue that if any country can break into the life-sciences industry from a
standing start Singapore probably has the best chance. The government in Singapore has a
track record in other fields of sticking with its plans, which is important as the development of
a life-science industry with require sustained efforts over many years. However, critics argue
that Singapore will only gain jobs and training from its huge investments in biomedical
science. They argue that students and researchers will consider Singapore as little more than a
stopover in their careers. It remains an open question whether Singapore will be able to
compete with cities such as Shanghai and be able to create a critical mass of first-class
scientists and infrastructure to successfully commercialise products.
The China Factor
China has become the great competitor for Southeast Asia. It is already a challenge in terms
of attracting foreign direct investment, and it is going to be a threat to Southeast Asia’s world
trade. As China becomes the world’s leading supplier of mass-produced goods, Southeast
Asia, as well as Japan and South Korea, will have to be opting for niche products of high
quality and prestige. The moves by Minolta in Japan illustrate ongoing changes
15.
By moving nearly all production of information-technology equipment, which accounts for
nearly four-fifths of consolidated sales, as well as low-end cameras overseas, Minolta hopes
to enhance cost competitiveness and earnings. Minolta Co. plans to halt domestic production
of photocopiers, printers and other equipment and shift it to two plants in China by 2006.
Minolta plans to halt during fiscal 2002 production of cameras in Malaysia, as the operations
are losing money. All camera production, except single-lens reflex and other high-end
models, will go to a plant in Shanghai.
Since China in the early 1980s embarked on its open-door policy, manufacturing companies
from all over the world have congregated in China to exploit the prospects for substantially
lower costs combined with a relatively skilled and disciplined labour force - not to forget the
huge domestic market potential. During the past 20 years China has emerged as the
￿workshop of the world￿ leaving Japan behind. However, it would be a great mistake to
continue to view China as the ￿workshop￿. China is rapidly advancing in many technological
fields, although its technological prowess still lags behind.
The increasingly close technological and industrial relations between Taiwan and the
Mainland is also effecting the ASEAN countries, considering that Taiwan directly controls 70
per cent of the global production of motherboards and indirectly another 15 per cent shipped
in complete PC sets ￿ in total the figure is approaching 90%. Taiwan produces some 55% of
all notebooks and design and miniaturising prowess gives Taiwan an edge in the manufacture
of many IT products. Five years ago 70% of Taiwan￿s production of IT hardware came from
Taiwan itself. The figure has annually been reduced by some 5% and is now down to 46%. In
the future it is expected that China will host 40% and Taiwan 40% while remaining will
locate close to markets. Production in Malaysia used to 10% but is now down to 4%.
It is becoming clear that China is not only becoming the factory of the world but also
increasingly attractive location for industrial research and development. Electronics and
information equipment manufactures, which are among chipmakers’ largest customers, are
                                                
15 Minolta shifts production of key products to China, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 1, 200225
increasingly shifting their chip design and development operations to China. Chipmakers, for
their part, face the need to strengthen their operations in China in order to work closely with
corporate customers from the early stages of chip design.
In a trend indicative of China’s growing dominance as a chip producer, Toshiba Corp. and
other major semiconductor manufacturers are rushing to strengthen their chip design and
development operations in the country
16. Toshiba plans to increase the number of engineers at
its chip-development centre in Shanghai from 40 to 100-200 this year and to 1,000 by the end
of fiscal 2003. The centre, established in July of last year, develops software to enhance the
audio and image-processing functions of system chips used in home electronics and
information equipment. Toshiba will shift its chip design and development operations to
China because it does not have a sufficient number of software engineers in Japan and
personnel expenses for Chinese engineers are around one-forth those of Japanese engineers.
Mitsubishi Electric Corp. will raise the number of staff members at its chip-design centre in
Beijing to nearly 300 from about 40 in the next three years. The centre will design and
develop micro-controllers for home electronics and other equipment to be supplied to local
electronics makers. NEC Corp. will expand the staff at its chip-design centre in Beijing to
more than 200 by end of 2002 from the current 170. In January 2001, Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. established a software-development centre for mobile communications and
audiovisual equipment in Beijing. The company will raise the number of engineers at the
centre to 1,500 in 2005 from about 60 at present.
An appreciation of the changing technological prowess was reflected in a heated debate in
Taiwan in early 2002 whether the Government would allow the transfer of 8￿ wafer plants
from Taiwan to China in order to manufacture advanced integrated circuits on the Mainland.
Capturing market shares for increasingly sophisticated products has motivated the investment
of 8￿ wafer plants in China. One example is the smart cards as the Chinese government has
decided that every citizen should have a smart card ￿ and that everything has to be produced
in China. However, only old equipment will be used ￿ as Taiwan is moving into 12￿ wafer
production. Subsequently, the National Science Council in Taiwan drafted a national science
and technology protection bill.
17 At the same time the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)
argues that, while not all high-tech talent will be restricted from working in China, there is a
need for supplementary legislation to prevent an exodus of high-tech workers and protect
core-advanced technology, following from the decision to allow idle 8￿ wafer plants to be
transferred to China.
18
China is being able to attract multinational companies to establish not only their production
bases but also sites for industrial research and development. Furthermore, the size of the
China market is attractive in itself but high-tech companies that want to serve FDI plants in
China are subsequently forced to establish themselves if they want to remain suppliers there.
Thus, China becomes a magnet that has strong attraction of technologies that will serve
China￿s continued development. Thus, China is becoming a centre for companies like
Flextronics and Solectron that provide electronic manufacturing services (EMS) to the large
electronic MNCs like Alcatel, Siemens, HP and Ericsson.
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18 MAC backs restrictions on China-bound tech workers, Taiwan News April 9 200226
Flextronics in early April 2002launched its industrial park in Shanghai and has thereby
brought the concept of electronics manufacturing services (EMS) to China. Flextronics
announced that it will develop a complete manufacturing centre that makes components,
cables, plastics, and metal parts needed for assembling products on site. It Flextronics will
provide a range of services centred on manufacturing, including innovative design,
engineering tests and logistic solutions ￿ to meet the need of their customers such as IBM,
dell, Cisco, Siemens, Ericsson and Alcatel. will also integrate with strategic suppliers who
have formed partnerships with Flextronics in China.
The same consequences are evident also in more mundane industrial sectors like motorcycles
and cars. The massive importation of motorcycle components into Vietnam in recent years,
which indicates a losing control of government technology and industrial policy.
19 In an
interview in mid-2002 a leading Chinese exporter of motorcycles provided the following
information to Vietnam
20.
The recent rapid expansion of exports to Vietnam indicates great possibilities for the
motorcycle manufacturers in China ￿ and possibly also for other engineering sectors. Hardly
any Chinese motorcycles were exported to Vietnam in 1998 while Chinese companies
captured 16 per cent of the market in 1998 of which Lifan & Hongda captured almost one
fourth ￿ 3-4% of the market in Vietnam. Dr Li says that the prediction is that motorcycles
from China will capture some 30 per cent of the market in Vietnam in 2000 and it is expected
that the share will increase substantially. This has greatly upset the Japanese manufacturers
who have actually ruled the market for motorcycles in Vietnam where they established
substantial production facilities.
The strategy to enter Vietnam was taken in late 1996 and early 1997 ￿ at the time when the
Group entered into the assembly of motorcycles. A major policy change took place in 1998
when Lifan & Hongda Group was given a general export license and could trade directly.
Before that time all exports had to go through one of the import/export companies
The emergence of strong industrial and technological prowess is also evident in the car
industry where the emergence of the Chery and he Merie ￿ two locally made cars that have
unexpectedly materialized during 2002 as the fasted selling models ￿ have surprised almost
everybody. One manufacturer is a former motorcycle parts maker and the other is company
that was established in one of the outlying provinces only 5 years ago
21. An important part of
the explanation lies in the rapid development of the Chinese car parts market that the
companies such as Volkswagen, Citroºn, Peugeot and Fiat have worked diligently to develop
since they entered China in the mid-1980s. As a result car parts that are often identical to
foreign brand components are today manufactured by thousands of Chinese companies, and
being sold on the open market.
The Future of S&T in ASEAN countries
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Publishers, Hanoi, 2002, pp 124-125
20 Interview with Manager in Charge of Marketing at Lifan & Hongda in Chongqing, June 9, 2000
21 Kynge, James, China￿s reverse shock, Financial Times June 7 200227
ASEAN countries have to cope with the rapid development of technology that lies at the core
of the cross-national production systems (CNPS) that in the past have greatly supported
export-oriented policies ￿ originally based on labour-intensive assembly. The changes at
Seagate, the leading manufacturer of hard disk drives provides illuminating insights. Seagate
and other manufacturers of hard disk drives, as well as many other producers of IT products
established large manufacturing networks in the region. The past two decades of technology-
driven mass-manufacture in Southeast Asia has given many countries in the region a physical
infrastructure that can compare with that of Europe ￿ with wide roads, uninterrupted
electricity, and modern ports and airports. However, the CNPS are requiring much less
manpower as both product and production technology rapidly changes. China is at the same
time becoming the preferred site of location for many activities.
The FDI inflow into chosen countries has decreased dramatically in the late 1990s. It has also
reshuffled the ranks of recipients. The most vulnerable in this respect appears to be Indonesia
and Philippines, which partly reflects the political turmoil, with Singapore and Vietnam
remaining relatively immune.
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The future of the countries in Southeast Asia is intimately linked with their development of a
sustained science and technology capability.  Competitiveness has been defined on the basis
of many criteria, including science, technology and management. Factors contributing
towards competitiveness include people, infrastructure, good governance, management and
science and technology. However; it is not only the financial crisis of 1997 that in a major
way has effected the economic development in the ASEAN countries. The same countries
have in recent years been greatly influenced by the emergence of China as the factory of the
world.
The countries covered in this paper continue to differ in performance. Singapore has
successfully kept ahead of its counterparts in the region by staying in the 2
nd place for years ￿
according to World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) released by the International institute28
of Management Development
22. Malaysia has been declining and Thailand, Philippines and
Indonesia are even lower. See table.
Table
Competitiveness ranking among selected ASEAN countries
1998 1999 2000
Singapore 2 2 2
Malaysia 20 27 25
Thailand 39 34 33
Philippines 32 32 39
Indonesia 40 46 45
Technological development in the five countries that have been briefly reviewed shows a
number of similarities with the exception of Singapore. They are still bogged down by low-
skill workers and low productivity.  They require new key elements of competitiveness, which
will have to come from enhanced capability in production, marketing and services.
The sectoral structures of their economies are changing but agriculture remains substantial
part of  their GDP composition. The new capability should be based on technology and
competence in management to a large degree.  Southeast Asia in general has to develop new
technology- and management-based capabilities, which will allow the countries to offer
higher quality, or new, goods and services at competitive prices, hence finding new niches in
global trade.  It should be noted that the technology base required for new competitiveness
does not necessarily require massive investments in R&D resources.
Vietnam remains still a very poor country but introducing significant reforms towards
privatisation and supporting private companies. Still the most critical issue is the level of
education and technological capabilities of private businesses located in particular in
agriculture
While still having relatively low labour cost, countries like Indonesia and the Philippines are
forced to restructure. Factors contributing towards competitiveness include people,
infrastructure, good governance, management and science and technology.  Each factor
depends in turn on a number of variables, but a key variable governing all of these factors to a
greater or lesser extent, at the present state of development of many Southeast Asian
economies, is innovation.  Innovation is defined here, not in a narrow technical sense, but as a
broad dynamic process of introduction of new beneficial elements into a system, which will
lead to better, more efficient performance of the system. Philippines at the beginning of 21
st
century undertook appealing efforts to stimulate local entrepreneurial forces.
A lack of sustainability characterises the development paths of many countries in this region,
although the future of these countries is intimately linked with the future of their science and
technology and education.  A shift in focus of the role of FDI in the globalisation process has
brought to the forefront the important but still relatively unfamiliar link with the development
of human capital. The MNCs create by their exposure to the global economy an awareness of
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modern technology and management. By exploiting this understanding the host countries
should not shift their educational policies to not only meet this demand and also diffuse such
skills throughout the economy.
While much of the blame can be laid on the weak financial infrastructure and poor corporate
governance, one of the root causes for development un-sustainability is the lack of
competitiveness of their economies, in turn resulting from lack of innovative capability based
on science and technology.  This is required in order for these countries to make economic
transitions necessary for advanced developing economies. A balanced development is
required, with emphasis placed on niche areas where these countries have strategic
advantages.
If a government wants to be successful in using technology to achieve rapid economic growth
it must not only identify and adopt the right basics but also be ale to effectively implement
them
23. This will require the country to have institutional mechanisms that should include an
environment that encourages private investment, a competent bureaucracy that can implement
adopted policies, and also institutions that facilitate communication between the state and
private sector.
Examination of the structural problems of countries like Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam
reveals a serious lack of human and social capital needed for sustainable participation in the
global economy.  Although they have large populations, the countries lack the capability
required for continually changing work demands. The importance of strategic, long-term
policy and planning in science, technology, and education is very clear, from the fact that they
need both considerable resources in order to carry out the planned activities, and a long lead













2,857 7,9 1157 930
Malaysia
8,209 15,4 1048 680
Philippines
3,805 17,6 2958 2817
Singapore
20,767 23,4 2730 1846
Vietnam
1,860 7,5 678 1194
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Source: ADB, UNESCO
Strategic planning in Southeast Asia has started to acquire an impetus with long-term policy
statements, such as Malaysia’s Vision 2020, and ASEAN Vision 2020.  A vision provides the
wanted scenario to strive for, and indicates the future point of a long-term policy. Even when
the government does involve itself, programs do not form an integrated technology strategy,
and the public often does not have good access to the process. It is generally agreed that
governments are most effective when they act as catalysts by providing missing components
such as R&D, education, agricultural extension etc. Thereby they are in the position to induce
firms to get on with effective innovations, and making markets work effectively. However,
even well intentioned and well formulated programs may become captured by vested
interests, which are likely to undermine the original objectives.
It is usually the case that the public learns about the government￿s plans after they have been
drafted.  So public hearings are often more about selling the proposal than gathering public
input. The current technological system operates in most countries largely within a market-
based framework.  There is a need for transparency in both the nature of technology, as well
as the decision-making process.  Exposing the decision-making process goes a long way to
ensuring better public accountability.  It is not surprising that in many areas where the press
has a high degree of freedom, we see greater public accountability in technological projects.31
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